307 - Can Israel Finally Craft a Sustainable Winning Strategy?
The Israeli air force has demonstrated that it can fly nearly 1,000 miles to Tehran, elude detection, refuel in midair, and use precision strikes to destroy Iranian missile batteries and fuel mixing depots, radar installations, and more -- all without inflicting civilian casualties. But with infinite imprecision it attacks hospitals and schools in Gaza; bombs both clustering Hezbollah combatants and uninvolved citizens in Beirut, Tyre, and the Beqaa Valley of Lebanon; and even attacks the UN's peacekeepers, also in Lebanon. Israel lashes out, but does it have a sustainable strategy?
Yahya Sinwar, Hamas' much feared and reviled militant leader was killed in southern Gaza -- but almost by chance, and by young soldiers who at first failed to recognize what their routine patrolling and accidental engagement had accomplished. And even after this signal dispatch of its arch enemy, Israel refuses (perhaps following orders from Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu) to bring order to the devastated Strip that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has relentlessly pulverized. Ninety percent of the buildings in the old Gaza Strip are no longer habitable. When will Israel take charge?
Israel wanted to show that it could assault Iran at will -- that it was more able, more powerful than its Shiite enemy. Israel also managed quite comfortably to demonstrate to the entire Middle East that its military possessed capabilities that were unmatched in the region. Hamas' atrocities a year ago unleashed, in other words, a ferocious Israeli capacity for carefully calibrated revenge, for retribution, and for defending what is, after all, a smallish state surrounded by larger and wealthier potential antagonists. It won wars in the last century and now seems poised to win again now. But then what? Is there an overall strategic plan?
Netanyahu refuses to declare victory, as President Biden has repeatedly urged him to do. He wants to wait at least until next week, to see whether an indulger or a constrainer is elected president of the United States. Netanyahu also knows that the longer the Middle Eastern war continues, the safer he is from an election at home that might bring about his political demise, a long-pending trial for corruption in office, and the end of his dominance of Israel. Could Netanyahu be so crass and self-centered to prolong the combat in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon in to save himself from unpleasant consequences? Is his consummate and inexplicable failure to control and administer the many sections of the Strip that the IDF has conquered not once but over and over, sometimes five or six times in a row, testify to his willingness to subordinate stabilizing Gaza to his own personal political survival needs?
I am not the only observer to puzzle over Israel's obstinate refusal to take charge of the lands and people its soldiers have subjugated. Many Israeli commentators lament the absolute refusal of their army to organize anything resembling a management strategy for what is left of the Strip. Instead, Arab criminal gangs have largely replaced the local Hamas-authorized police. Mafiosa, tolerated (why?) by Israel, steal from the bedraggled, struggling, poor of Gaza, grab and then resell food and other relief supplies distributed by aid agencies, and make much more miserable people's lives already endlessly upended.
A former high-ranking Israeli military intelligence officer yesterday decried his compatriots' "failed approach to the [Gaza] war." Israel has "fought Hamas and withdrawn, only to return to the same places months later after the militants have reestablished themselves." He continued: "It's unbelievable. When are we going to learn?"
If Israel only took charge, doing so would be welcomed by the remaining residents of Gaza, by the local directors of hospitals and schools, by relief agencies, and by President Biden's team. Arguably, and commonsensically, taking charge would help Israel's continuing battle against Hamas. Now it lets Hamas regroup over and over again. Why not gradually extend Israeli control systematically across flattened Gaza? Israel could establish order that way, keeping Hamas operatives from returning to section after section. Moreover, food suppliers and food and water distribution could more easily be managed that way, with the civilian population benefiting and Israel gaining back a little of what it has lost by killing so many civilians.
By establishing order and banishing the gangs and corruption, Israel could improve Gaza somewhat and help to begin to make it more livable instead of the festering and dangerous hell hole it is at present.
One more result could be the identification of Hamas suspects. If Israel administered Gaza, even roughly, it would be able to separate innocent civilians from likely Hamas soldiers. That could bring Israel much closer than to accomplishing Netanyahu's goal of completely extirpating Hamas. Israel cannot destroy Hamas the idea, but it can corral militant adherents if it fully manages the Strip.
Without governing rather than bombing and strafing the Strip, Israel cannot eliminate Hamas, just as Hezbollah the movement cannot be squelched even through its missile emplacements and ammunition dumps can more readily be destroyed and its ability to attack Israel can be greatly reduced.
A President Kamala Harris might be able to help Netanyahu understand how much Israel needs a winning strategy, not just a collection of tactical maneuvers -- so far impressive and successful, but hardly sustainable. It will be past time after next week to turn the Israeli offensive toward accomplishing larger goals. Demonstrating its fighting skills is all well and good, but hardly sufficient to secure Israel going forward.