Not only do the two most powerful generals who rule Sudan in defiance of almost daily protests by students and professionals behave autocratically -- as Putin does on a much larger and murderous scale -- they also now rely on his and Russia’s material and military backing. Just as Putin began invading Ukraine, he also consolidated his military presence in several African countries, notably Sudan. A naval base on the Red Sea is contemplated.
Since a coup in October ended two years of civilian rule (with military officers in the background) massive groups of popular dissenters have so far been unable to oust the generals and restore a civilian prime minister and technocrats to power. Soldiers firing on crowds in six cities have led to 90 deaths and many thousands wounded since December. Despite facing soldiers shooting into passive civilian gatherings, knots of weekly protestors continue to demand justice and the civil rule that was lost last year. Whether these demonstrations will lead, as they did in 2019, to a reverse of military rule is not likely. Such resistance has also failed in Egypt, and in Myanmar (see Substack #23, April 4).
Avarice always influences. Military officers in Africa and Asia resent civilian leaders. They absolutely fear giving up their power and privilege but, even more, they refuse to let civilians interfere with their lucrative grip on a wide range of moneymaking enterprises. In Myanmar (formerly Burma), in Sri Lanka, in Pakistan, in Egypt, and in Sudan that was the case, leading to last year’s coup.
The Putin-like generals in charge in Sudan are Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemeti). The latter heads the vicious paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, responsible for much of the violence against protesters last year and this year, and also the leader of the so-called Janjaweed militias that perpetrated documented crimes against humanity in Darfur, Sudan’s westernmost province, from 2003 to 2010.
It is on account of those atrocities in Darfur, and also in the Kordofan and West Nile provinces of Sudan, that the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted President Omar al-Bashir in 2010 for genocidal acts. Since the protests of 2019 that forced Hemeti and Burhan to oust Bashir, the former president has been imprisoned in Sudan. The generals now in charge will not send him for trial in The Hague, however, for fear that they themselves will be implicated publicly in his and the Sudanese government’s vast misdeeds. One lower echelon Janjaweed officer is, however, now on trial for war crimes before the ICC.
Sudan’s ruling generals (like those in Myanmar) worried before October’s ouster of the civilian government about letting civilians gain full control for fear that civil authorities might examine everything that the military has done since 2000 to terrorize Sudan’s people, especially in Darfur. There, the Janjaweed militia, often led by Hemeti, massacred civilians, indulged in episodes of ethnic cleansing, gang raped, and strafed encampments. The generals are hardly anxious to be held accountable.
Hemeti, close to Bashir, is particularly at risk. Both he and Burhan, and the other military members of the junta that now rules Sudan, have sticky fingers deep into the commercial entrails of their country. Commercial profits from trucking businesses, livestock exporting concerns, construction corporations, and pharmaceutical manufacturing help fund army activities. The generals also control Sudan’s gold mines.
Returns from all of these entrepreneurial enterprises flow generously into personal pockets (as they do in Russia and Myanmar). Sentry, an authoritative think tank in Washington, reports that the military’s commercial operations are vastly corrupt. Few pay taxes. The people of Sudan, with a per capita annual GDP of about $660 (low even for Africa) benefit little from what the army generals oversee and skim.
Hemeti recently welcomed Russians, principally mercenaries from the Wagner Group - agents for Putin through its proxy financiers -- to bolster the generals and their post-coup regime in Sudan. Hemeti was in Moscow when Putin invaded Ukraine, doubtless discussing the naval base that Russia is contemplating constructing on the Red Sea at Port Sudan, the better to project its naval power into a global transport corridor and choke point. “We have no problem dealing with Russia or anyone to build a naval base along our Red Sea coast as long as it doesn’t threaten our security interests,” Hemeti said. He may have also talked with officials in Moscow about how profits from the gold mining concessions that Sudan has granted to Russians are to be allocated. (It is at least because of gold sales to Russia that Sudan abstained during the recent UN General Assembly vote condemning Putin’s invasion.)
Amid all of this posturing and playing off Moscow against Washington -- which has been attempting along with a UN special representative to re-democratize Sudan and end the total grip of the junta -- Sudan’s economy is in downward spiral. Annual inflation is over 260 percent, Sudan needs to renegotiate its heavy debt load. Meanwhile, the loss of wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine will make the lives of most Sudanese increasingly onerous. The price of wheat has risen more than 200 percent since a year ago April. A spreading drought in the region will hardly ease conditions. About 9 million of the country’s 44 million people face acute hunger, according to the World Food Program.
Washington, which took Sudan off the official terrorist watch list only last year, will continue to have serious discussions with the Sudanese junta about its tilt toward Putin and Russia, especially in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine. President Biden’s administration can help with aid and with assistance to Sudan from the IMF, and it must make transparent to the Sudanese generals that the battle between Russia and the free world is for real. African countries must take sides. For Sudan that means rebuffing Russia and renouncing the lucrative corrupt funding that flows together with Russian gold purchases (sanctions should apply) and Russian talk of establishing a base. The members of the junta should painfully be made aware of how their self-interests must now bow before the interests of the peoples of Sudan, and of the world. Cozying up to pariahs inevitably taints a compromised regime like the Sudan’s, which struggles daily to appear legitimate.
Excellent overview. There is so much more that the United States could do right now. It would be great if Payton Knopf, now acting envoy, would be named permanently to the post. And he should be armed with an aggressive and escalating sanctions strategy targeting Hemedti's commercial empire, particularly in the gold sector, and other key networks rooted in the RSF and SAF. US diplomacy without leverage is unlikely to move the needle. For all the reasons Mr. Rotberg cites, the US and its allies in the Troika and EU need to seriously step up their game.