165 - Ukraine and the Guns of April: Getting Ready for Battle
In a long slog of a war, which Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has become, logistical success and competence are key. That, in part, is what the leaked or hacked intelligence papers show. Just as Russia is unable for now to produce sufficient trained troops, missile, artillery, tanks, or ammunition to overwhelm Ukrainian resistance in the way that Putin imagined a year ago, so the valiant and hard-pressed Ukrainians can fight as strongly as they must. But unless quantities of Western armaments keep coming and coming, and Western factories turn out literally millions of 155 mm shells every month, Ukraine keep fighting only with increasing difficulty.
Among other pressing concerns, Ukraine’s defense against Russian air might needs upgrading. Thus far in the war, Russia has not fully unleashed its air power, fearing reasonably effective Ukrainian defenses. But those older ex-Soviet antiaircraft batteries are wearing out and ammunition is running low. Repaired older aircraft and new antiaircraft batteries have been slow in reaching Ukraine from its NATO allies. Without a big surge, soon, the balance of power that has so far kept Ukraine free may simply erode – a moment for which Putin and his generals have long been waiting. For its own sake as well as for Ukraine, the West must redouble its attempt to fill Ukraine’s emptying coffers of combat.
Tanks from the U. S., Germany, Poland, and Britain and other NATO countries are finally arriving, notably the first of up to 100 Leopard 2s. American tanks are coming as well, but slowly. Those Abrams 1 tanks take some learning -- how to drive them, how to use them to shoot effectively, and – most of all – how to repair them when they (inevitably) breakdown. But if the Ukrainians master the American tanks as well as they are adapting to the Leopards, eventually Ukrainian armored columns will be able to shell Russian positions from a greater distance (5,000 yards) than that from which the Russians can retaliate.
Ukrainians have so far been quick learners in training camps in Kansas, Norway, and elsewhere. They have re-mastered old Soviet equipment (on which they were trained years ago) and mastered more modern Russian equipment (including tanks) taken from the enemy. They command HIMARS artillery batteries and are becoming expert at using the Patriot anti-aircraft missile system. Overall, a fired-up morale and a fight for their very existence as Ukrainians has motivated all manner of Ukrainian soldiery to do far more and act much more competently than anticipated. Their trainers in Europe and the U.S. are impressed.
Unlike their hapless Russian opponents, the Ukrainians (to a man and to a woman) believe strongly in that for which they are fighting. Enduring frozen feet in trenches, endless flooding, constant bombardments on the front lines, and grave shortages of comfort and food have not so far deterred the Ukrainian war machine. Hence President Volodymyr Zelensky’s recent morale uplifting tours of the several war fronts. The Ukrainians on the front lines know that their resistance is essential if a stronger Ukraine than before is to emerge from the war. They are united in believing that Putin’s imperialist invasion has no purpose other than inflating his personal vanity.
But they also know that they cannot beat back the Russians, or even try soon to cut off Crimea from the Donbas, without abundant artillery and tank shells. The will to fight depends almost entirely at this juncture on the steady arrival of such fundamental replacement supplies. Some NATO members, like Germany, fear running down their own stocks of shells to the point where its own army would be defenseless. The Pentagon, faced with the likelihood of war in Asia as well as Europe, has many of the same concerns.
Norway has a major munitions factory accustomed to supply much of Europe. But it can’t keep up. Some of the raw materials it needs to manufacture missiles and projectiles are difficult to procure. Even working three shifts a day, it still can only produce less than what Ukraine and other armies in the West now require. Even if Washington declared a war emergency and pushed manufacturers in the U.S. to redouble their efforts, it would take months, even years, to meet the needs of Ukraine’s defensive, much less offensive, endeavors.
Stockpiles are running down. South Korea is being cajoled to send supplies to Ukraine via third countries. (North Korea sends war goods directly to Moscow). And Ukraine and NATO scour the free world for old ex-Soviet arms and ammunition as well as anything more modern. Switzerland could help, for example, but it still clings to its fabled neutrality (a posture that Sweden and Finland have now eschewed).
Turkey could do much more than it is doing to assist Ukraine. Facilitating the export of wheat and barley from Odesa and other Black Sea ports despite Russian blockades is positive. Its drones fly for Ukraine, too. But with the second largest military establishment in NATO it could do far more than now to assist: it has aircraft, tanks, and artillery that Ukraine could use if Turkey were not so wedded to playing up to Putin and both allowing crucial components such as semi-conductors to transit Turkey for Moscow and refusing to give Ukraine lethal weapons and ammunition replacements. Greece has abundant tanks that it could give Ukraine, but fears a Turkish assault.
Distinguished former military leaders in NATO and retired American admirals and generals have been asking Washington to give Ukraine what it needs to win the war. They want Ukraine to oust Putin’s legions from Crimea and to compel Putin to sue for peace from a weaker bargaining posture. They advocate shipping all manner of heavy arms to Ukraine now, even modern aircraft, missiles, and numerous upgraded howitzers. They applaud President Biden’s early caution, but today advocate a rapid escalation of effective support.
Doing so makes perfect sense strategically, especially now that Putin’s side is weakened and because the American generals and others argue that Putin both cannot and will not shoot off his nukes, no matter what. Admiral James G. Stavridis, a sometime NATO supreme allied forces commander and former dean of the Fletcher School, believes that Putin knows that if he did so he would lose support even from among those African, Asian, and Latin American countries that now back him (either directly, or by remaining “neutral”).
But there is a weak link. Logistics. The war in Ukraine is a consummate battle for freedom. Thus, we should strip ourselves as much as possible to supply Ukraine. But are there sufficient pieces of equipment and, crucially, enough shells out there to do so? Without being assured of steady re-supplies, Ukraine can hardly attack (which Putin knows). Hence, breaking the current stalemate depends on renewed refurbishments. From whence will they come? And how soon?