Is the killing of nearly 1,000 Lebanese civilians and Hezbollah fighters in Israel's immediate interest? Does it make sense at this point for Israel to widen its pummeling of Palestinians to encompass an all-out war with Hezbollah when Hamas is still not defeated? Is it helpful for Israel's short- and long-term security to fight on three full fronts and, conceivably, incite Iran to open up a fourth front? Peace in the Middle East deserves a better strategy.
Obviously, Israel's Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and at least key members of his general staff think the time is ripe to weaken, conceivably to attempt to destroy, Hezbollah even though Hamas is still active, Israel continues to raid militant bases in the West Bank, and the Houthis send occasional missiles from Yemen. Seventy thousand Israeli kibbutzniks and others have been forced to flee border outposts just south of Lebanon; Netanyahu wants to bring them home, safely, and to keep them secure.
"Those who have a missile in their living room and a rocket in their garage will not have a home,” says Netanyahu, warning Hezbullah leaders and recruits. But the Israeli strikes into Lebanon are not sufficiently precise to keep non-Hezbollah civilians unharmed. Civilians have fled the Lebanese south and the suburbs of Beirut where Hezbollah operatives live.
Europe and the U.S. are demanding a ceasefire, but twisting Israel’s arm is going to be difficult.
Restoring security in Israel's far north is the proximate reason for assaulting Hezbollah so fully after months of tit-for-tat missile, artillery, and drone exchanges. But the deeper reason for expanding the anti-Iranian proxy battles that followed Hamas' Oct. 7 massacre has as much to do with strengthening Netanyahu's position as an indispensable political force within an Israel that (public polls show) wants him out. It also reinforces his ties with the extreme ultra-orthodox set of rabid politicians who sit in his cabinet and pledge to bring his government down if he so much as tries to negotiate a cease-fire settlement with Hamas or otherwise weakens his so far forceful response to Iran and Shia Islam.
Netanyahu and his hawkish war cabinet may also be motivated by Iran and Hezbollah's apparent hesitation to engage in all-out war because they both find the timing of a full-scale war inconvenient. Because of weaknesses in Iran and the catastrophically stunted economic and political situation in Lebanon, Hezbollah is not ready to engage in a full war. Lebanon would be destroyed and Hezbollah with it despite Hezbollah's formidable army and its vast array of missiles. At least that is what Israel conjectures.
Israel discovered recently that Hezbollah was not immediately as formidable it once assumed. By destroying pagers and walkie-talkies, it showed Israel's power and its ability to interfere with and subvert Hezbollah's communications and planning. Israel discovered that it could, and so it did, strike forcefully against Hezbollah.
In doing so, of course, Israel once again lost world backing. Killing more than 500 persons, including some children, on a single day this week gained Israel few friends. Israel is already a pariah. Netanyahu says that hardly matters, given the struggle to secure itself and the forces arrayed against the state, and him. He listens to Washington, agrees, and then does the opposite. (And the U.S. has not refused to resupply war material to the Israeli Defense Forces, IDF.)
Nevertheless, legitimacy in global affairs is still critical. Israel cannot afford to be rejected by many Americans, Canadians, and Europeans. Its cause cannot afford to become a political liability for prime ministers and presidents elsewhere. Striking deeply into Lebanon, killing leaders, showing the might of its air force and the ingenuity of Mossad and its other secret operatives is not enough to win popular global backing for Israel's derring-do. Doing so wins battles but not the overall war. Victory must instead be achieved in time by driving hard toward the two-state solution and the respect for Palestine and Palestinians that Netanyahu believes he cannot afford to express internally within his cabinet of ministers. He thinks that he cannot given personal political, economic, and judicial considerations wind down his response to the Hamas' dastardly attack on innocents.
If by attacking Hezbollah heavily Israel can regain control of the Lebanese border regions and move its settlers back onto towns and village that nestle just under the Lebanese border, the result could be worth doubling down on Israel's outcast status. Showing Israel's strength in such a manner, as well as its diabolical ability to infiltrate Hezbollah communications, could be worth the losses of legitimacy -- even mooted prosecutions for war crimes by the ICC. Or so Netanyahu believes.
But what Israel is doing now in Gaza and Lebanon is tactical, not strategic. It makes short term gains of some significance (if Hezbollah fails to respond violently) but sacrifices the long-term advantages that occurred after Oct. 7. It stretches the Israeli Defense Force to a breaking point. It means the re-calling into service of 1 million reservists and risks destroying Israel's economy. It keeps Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem on alert for days and weeks more.
Moreover, this is exactly not the moment for a ground invasion of Lebanon. Sending troops into Lebanon would inflame the exploding conflict too dangerously.
There has to be a better way for Israel to assert its hegemony in the Middle East. Understandably and laudably, Israel seeks to remove the massive threat of Hezbollah, poised to attack from north of its border. Moreover, it wants to do so precisely because the war against Hamas has stagnated, with perhaps 17,000 enemy combatants and a handful of Hamas leaders dead, and with Gaza reduced to rubble and possibly as many as 25,000 civilians killed --grossly unfortunate collateral damage.
War crimes have obviously been committed on all sides. But given what the IDF has done to Hezbollah and what it has failed to do to Hamas, this is the precise moment to declare victory and establish a workable Palestinian state. Netanyahu wants nothing resembling such an authentic potential partner and adversary. Indeed, the extreme right-wing irredentists to whom he is allied still seek to expunge all Palestinians from Judea and Samaria -- an illicit and inappropriate ambition at any time, especially now.
But success for Israel and peace in the Arab Middle East depends entirely on Netanyahu breaking with his extreme backers, building a new internal coalition, and forging an enduring relationship of mutual support with Saudia Arabia and others. Simply fighting and fighting, with many more casualties likely, is no sustainable answer to Israel's fundamental security needs.
I should have noted also that this is a situation that both Netanyahu and Trump understand and exploit daily.
All such articles run up against the usual barrier. Netanyahu isn’t going to change a policy that he thinks is not only good but essential for himself. If fact the more civilian casualties the better. The only way to change that would be for the US to stop sending arms. But the one time Biden tried Netanyahu immediately charged him with sabotage, and Republicans made such a public relations success of it that it appeared it would cost the election—a result that would be demonstrably terrible even for Palestinians. So we’re stuck until after the election—a horrible situation.